SHC Rules Out Intra-Court Appeals Against Recognition of Foreign Arbitral Awards

A Division Bench has held that a judgment recognising a foreign arbitral award is passed in a special statutory jurisdiction and cannot be appealed under section 3(1) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972.
A Division Bench of the High Court of Sindh has dismissed two High Court Appeals filed against the recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award in favour of The Resource Group International Limited (“TRGI”), holding that the appeals were not maintainable. Mohsin Tayebaly & Co. acted for TRGI before the Single Judge and in the appeals.
The judgment was delivered on November 20, 2026 in H.C.A. Nos. 28 and 29 of 2026 by Mr. Justice Arshad Hussain Khan and Mr. Justice Amjad Ali Sahito. It decides whether an intra-court appeal lies under section 3(1) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 against a judgment passed under the Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011 (the “2011 Act”). As the Bench observed, earlier appeals of this kind had been heard on the merits without that question being decided.
Background
The award was made in a JAMS arbitration seated in New York under a stock purchase agreement of 2005. A Partial Final Award of February 04, 2025 was incorporated into a Final Award of April 22, 2025, which the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York confirmed on June 20, 2025.
TRGI applied to the High Court of Sindh under section 6 of the 2011 Act. By a common judgment dated August 31, 2026 in J.M. Nos. 05 and 23 of 2025, a Single Judge recognised the Final Award and directed that a decree be drawn. The decree followed on September 16, 2026. The award debtor then appealed to a Division Bench under section 3(1) of the Law Reforms Ordinance.
No appeal under section 3(1)
Section 3(1) provides an appeal to a bench of two or more judges from a decree or final order made by a Single Judge in the exercise of the High Court’s original civil jurisdiction. The Bench held that the provision does not give a general right of appeal against every final order of a Single Judge. Whether it applies depends on the nature of the jurisdiction in which the order was made.
The 2011 Act, the Bench found, sets up a special statutory mechanism. Section 3 identifies the High Court as the competent court, and sections 6 and 7 prescribe how an award is recognised and the limited grounds on which recognition may be refused. Section 3(3) applies the procedure of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 “as nearly as may be”, but that does not turn the proceedings into an ordinary civil suit or add to the appellate remedies otherwise available.
The Bench relied on Syed Arif Raza Rizvi v. Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (PLD 2001 SC 182), in which the Supreme Court distinguished ordinary original civil jurisdiction from special or statutory jurisdiction and explained that proceedings do not fall within the former merely because they are instituted directly in the High Court. The 2011 Act does not contemplate a civil trial, and it does not allow the Court to decide afresh contractual rights that the arbitral tribunal has already determined.
Two further points were dealt with. The fact that the Single Judge’s judgment results in a decree under section 6 does not determine the character of the jurisdiction, because it is the substance of the proceedings that governs and not their nomenclature or form. And although intra-court appeals in enforcement cases have been entertained on the merits, including in Mughal Iron & Steel Industries v. Metro Metals Northwest (2026 LHC 5799), the mere entertainment of an appeal does not establish that it is maintainable.
The Bench also considered Frontier Holdings Limited v. Petroleum Exploration (Pvt.) Limited (2025 SCMR 1907). It noted that the Supreme Court had there granted leave to examine, among other things, whether an intra-court appeal lies in proceedings under the 2011 Act, but had not finally decided the question.
The objections, considered in the alternative
The finding on maintainability was enough to dispose of the appeals. As both sides had argued the case in full, the Bench went on to examine the objections in the alternative, making clear that it was not doing so as an independent exercise of appellate jurisdiction. It found that they disclosed no ground for refusal under section 7 of the 2011 Act read with Article V of the New York Convention. Among the points decided:
- The clauses providing for New York law, arbitration in New York and the jurisdiction of the New York courts regulate the governing law, the arbitral procedure and the jurisdiction of those courts. They do not prohibit recognition and enforcement of the award in another Contracting State.
- On territorial jurisdiction, the award debtor’s residence in Lahore was not by itself determinative. The award concerned rights and obligations relating to shares pledged in Karachi, and that was a sufficient connection.
- The applications had been filed before the fourteen-day period under Rule 24(k) of the JAMS Rules expired. By the time of the Single Judge’s judgment that period had long since run and the award had been confirmed in New York. Article V(1)(e) is concerned with whether the award has become binding, not with whether an application was filed before a procedural period expired.
- Seeking confirmation or enforcement at the seat does not extinguish the right to seek recognition and enforcement elsewhere. Any amount recovered in another jurisdiction must be accounted for so that there is no double recovery.
- Order II Rule 2 CPC did not bar the second application. It concerned attorney’s fees and costs which the arbitrator had not determined when the first application was filed, and the rule against splitting claims does not reach a claim that had not yet been adjudicated.
- The arbitrator’s interpretation of the contract is not open to reconsideration by the enforcing court. Sections 35 and 35-A CPC regulate costs in proceedings before Pakistani courts and do not invalidate an arbitrator’s award of contractual costs. Section 74 of the Contract Act, 1872 does not permit the amount to be revisited unless a Convention ground is established.
- Following Orient Power Company (Pvt.) Limited v. Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited (2021 SCMR 1728) and Taisei Corporation v. A.M. Construction Company (Pvt.) Limited (2024 SCMR 640), the public policy exception under Article V(2)(b) is confined to violations of the fundamental notions of morality and justice of the enforcing State. An allegation that the costs awarded are excessive does not meet that threshold.
The Single Judge’s judgment and decree were left undisturbed. The Bench clarified that execution must remain confined to the express terms of the award, and that any recovery under the same award in another jurisdiction is to be accounted for.
Why the decision matters
For a party holding a foreign award, the practical effect is that a recognition judgment of the High Court of Sindh under the 2011 Act is not open to a further appeal before a Division Bench of the same Court. That takes one tier of challenge out of the path from recognition to execution. The Bench noted that the Supreme Court’s order in Frontier Holdings granted leave on the question without finally deciding it, so the last word may yet come from that Court.
The alternative findings are useful in their own right. They confirm that the grounds in Article V are exhaustive and narrowly construed, with the burden ordinarily on the party resisting enforcement, and that the enforcing court does not rehear the underlying dispute. In the Bench’s words, the pro-enforcement approach of the 2011 Act “does not dispense with judicial scrutiny”. It confines that scrutiny to the grounds recognised by Article V.
The MTC team
TRGI was represented by Arshad Tayebaly, Senior Partner, Sameer Tayebaly, Senior Associate, Aitzaz Manzoor Memon, Senior Associate, Ammar Suria, Senior Associate, and Zalland Kasi, Associate.